{"id":243507,"date":"2026-01-30T11:24:44","date_gmt":"2026-01-30T16:24:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/?p=243507"},"modified":"2026-01-30T16:06:53","modified_gmt":"2026-01-30T21:06:53","slug":"us-tariffs-yield-gains-and-losses-in-global-trade-as-supply-chains-reconfigure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/knowledge-center\/trade-data\/us-tariffs-yield-gains-and-losses-in-global-trade-as-supply-chains-reconfigure\/","title":{"rendered":"U.S. Tariffs Yield Gains and Losses in Global Trade as Supply Chains Reconfigure"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>U.S. trade policies scored tactical gains in 2025, closing the trade gap and boosting&nbsp;Foreign Direct Investment&nbsp;(FDI). But the strategic&nbsp;objective&nbsp;\u2013 reindustrializing the U.S. \u2013&nbsp;remains&nbsp;a distant goal. Meanwhile, Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&#x2122;&nbsp;data shows, some sectors are sustaining collateral damage as U.S. tariffs strain and reshape global trade relationships.&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group has-background is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\" style=\"background-color:#f7f7f7\">\n<p><strong>Key Takeaways<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>U.S. tariffs narrowed the trade deficit and boosted foreign direct investment in 2025, but reindustrialization gains&nbsp;remain&nbsp;limited.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Manufacturing-focused FDI increased as investors adjusted to clearer U.S. tariff frameworks and bilateral trade agreements.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Mexico overtook China as the top U.S. trading partner as supply chains shifted away from tariff-exposed routes.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>U.S. maritime import and export volumes declined in the second half of 2025 amid tariff-driven trade disruption.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Retaliation against U.S. tariffs severely&nbsp;impacted&nbsp;agricultural exports, particularly soybeans, cotton, and pork.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The economic costs of U.S. tariffs continue to ripple through global supply chains, reinforcing long-term trade volatility.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>How Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&nbsp;can help businesses navigate U.S. tariffs in 2026.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>Data released&nbsp;on&nbsp;January 8 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)&nbsp;indicates&nbsp;progress toward two goals of the U.S. tariffs and broader U.S. trade policies,&nbsp;as&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/about\/policy-offices\/press-office\/blogs-and-op-eds\/2025\/trumps-trade-representative-why-we-remade-global-order\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">articulated by the U.S. Trade Representative<\/a>&nbsp;(USTR): readjusting the trade balance between the U.S. and its trade partners and reindustrializing the U.S. economy.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>First, the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bea.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/2026-01\/trad1025.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">U.S. goods and services trade deficit in October 2025<\/a>&nbsp;declined&nbsp;nearly 40%&nbsp;from the preceding month, falling to its lowest level since 2009.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>1<\/em><em>&nbsp;The U.S. Trade Deficit in October<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"667\" height=\"527\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig1b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic depicting U.S. trade deficit in October 2025.\" class=\"wp-image-243518\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig1b.webp 667w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig1b-480x379.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) 667px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Source:&nbsp;Bureau of Economic Analysis<\/em>&nbsp;<br><em>U.S. Census Bureau<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>Second, BEA quarterly data on foreign direct investment (FDI) shows inflows to the U.S. reaching&nbsp;$89 billion&nbsp;in third-quarter 2025, a slight improvement over&nbsp;$86.5 billion&nbsp;in 2Q25, and a substantial increase from&nbsp;$43.03 billion&nbsp;in 1Q25.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>2<\/em><em>&nbsp;Quarterly FDI into and out of the U.S.<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"816\" height=\"450\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig2b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic depicting quarterly FDI into and out of the U.S.\" class=\"wp-image-243519\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig2b.webp 816w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig2b-480x265.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) 816px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Source:&nbsp;Bureau of Economic Analysis<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>According to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fdiintelligence.com\/content\/6d163dbd-1184-423f-8e45-3d6b12fe6c10\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">fDi&nbsp;Intelligence<\/a>&nbsp;(the source for the above charts),&nbsp;much of the gain is due to new equity inflows, which surged to&nbsp;$40.6 billion&nbsp;in 3Q25, compared with&nbsp;$10.5 billion&nbsp;in 2024.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A big chunk&nbsp;is earmarked for manufacturing. Analysis from the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/globalbusiness.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/FDIUS-3rd-Q-2025-FInal.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Global Business Alliance<\/a>&nbsp;(GBA) finds the manufacturing sector accounted for&nbsp;$97 billion&nbsp;in the first nine months of 2025. The Trump&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/investments\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">administration\u2019s tally of investors<\/a>&nbsp;counts 137 companies and sovereign entities, with about 70% committing to manufacturing upgrades,&nbsp;expansions&nbsp;or greenfield projects.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It would seem that after the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/knowledge-center\/trade-data\/trade-data-shows-varied-effects-of-us-tariffs-on-downstream-industries\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">uncertainty surrounding U.S. tariffs and trade policies<\/a>&nbsp;at the start of 2025&nbsp;something would&nbsp;had&nbsp;eased for investors.&nbsp;As&nbsp;GBA&nbsp;CEO Jonathan Samford told&nbsp;fDi&nbsp;Intelligence, U.S. bilateral trade frameworks that started being released in the summer \u201chave given better clarity\u201d on the intention and scope of U.S.&nbsp;trade policies. Still, he said, \u201ca lot could change.\u201d&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">New Frameworks for Trade with the U.S.&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed, the Trump administration provided some clarification on its&nbsp;objectives&nbsp;with the September 5 publication of a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/09\/modifying-the-scope-of-reciprocal-tariffs-and-establishing-procedures-for-implementing-trade-and-security-agreements\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">process for reaching bilateral trade agreements<\/a>&nbsp;with countries subject to the blanket reciprocal U.S. tariffs announced in April and effective in August 2025.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>October\u2019s final agreements with&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefings-statements\/2025\/10\/agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-kingdom-of-cambodia-on-reciprocal-trade\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Cambodia<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefings-statements\/2025\/10\/agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-malaysia-on-reciprocal-trade\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Malaysia<\/a>, and the frameworks for trade agreements with&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefings-statements\/2025\/10\/joint-statement-on-a-framework-for-a-united-states-thailand-agreement-on-reciprocal-trade\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Thailand<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefings-statements\/2025\/10\/joint-statement-on-united-states-vietnam-framework-for-an-agreement-on-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Vietnam<\/a>, reflect the process.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Briefly,&nbsp;the&nbsp;final&nbsp;deal with Cambodia calls for reciprocal tariffs and quotas&nbsp;to be subject to the agreement of both partners. Non-tariff barriers \u2013 such as opaque import licensing or domestic standards aimed at selectively restricting trade \u2013 are to be lowered.&nbsp;Intellectual property is&nbsp;to be protected.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Additional&nbsp;points of agreement address U.S. economic and security&nbsp;objectives, including collaboration on regulating trade in sensitive technologies, enforcing sanctions, and preventing illegal transshipments.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finally, there are commercial considerations:&nbsp;the agreements with Cambodia and Malaysia include commitments to&nbsp;facilitate&nbsp;U.S. investment in the exploration and extraction of critical minerals and energy resources.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There are frameworks in place for negotiations with the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/about\/policy-offices\/press-office\/fact-sheets\/2025\/may\/fact-sheet-us-uk-reach-historic-trade-deal\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">United Kingdom<\/a>&nbsp;(agreed in May) and the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/07\/fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-european-union-reach-massive-trade-deal\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">EU<\/a>&nbsp;(July), with formal trade pacts pending. The&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/10\/28195\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">U.S. and Japan&nbsp;trade deal<\/a>&nbsp;initially framed in July was&nbsp;finalized&nbsp;in October.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In November, the U.S. announced frameworks for agreements on reciprocal trade with\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/url.us.m.mimecastprotect.com\/s\/XP-6CDkJY7h5p62w0i5hAHjnX7G?domain=ustr.gov\">Ecuador<\/a>. There is also an agreed framework for reciprocal trade and investment with\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/url.us.m.mimecastprotect.com\/s\/1WXgCJ67YjfqO4Gl5Svt1Hy7oaM?domain=ustr.gov\">Argentina<\/a>. The U.S. signed an agreement with\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/url.us.m.mimecastprotect.com\/s\/ZaJ1CER6Z7C3yArOMSpiLH7sbE_?domain=ustr.gov\">El Salvador<\/a>\u00a0on January 29, and with\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/url.us.m.mimecastprotect.com\/s\/TcWrCG6QY7f1nyxEGUQsgHBvv4h?domain=ustr.gov\">Guatemala<\/a>\u00a0on January 30.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Also in November, the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/11\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">U.S. and China agreed to ratchet back<\/a>&nbsp;some of their draconian trade remedies, declaring a one-year truce.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So, some clarity and a promise of more stability in the application of U.S. tariffs. But as GBA\u2019s Samford cautioned:&nbsp;things could change.&nbsp;At this writing, the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c4gwp2me3gzo\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">European Parliament has suspended the approval of a U.S. trade deal<\/a>&nbsp;agreed in July in protest<strong>\u202f<\/strong>over the U.S. quest for Greenland.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Especially consequential, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) will be up for its six-year review this July, a moment that could reset U.S. tariffs across North America.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Mexico Rises as Top U.S. Trading Partner&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The U.S. decoupling from China, underway since 2016, gained momentum last year. Once the top source for imports ranked by value, claiming 21.5% share in 2015, China ceded first place to Mexico in 2023. In the 12 months ending with October 2025, it slipped to third behind USMCA partner Canada, with a U.S. market share just shy of 10%.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>3<\/em><em>&nbsp;Top Countries of Origin for U.S. Imports 12 months ending in October 2024 vs 2025<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1104\" height=\"387\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig3b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic comparing top countries of origin for U.S. imports in October 2024 vs. 2025.\" class=\"wp-image-243520\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig3b.webp 1104w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig3b-980x344.webp 980w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig3b-480x168.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) and (max-width: 980px) 980px, (min-width: 981px) 1104px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>With trade tensions slowing commerce in both directions between the U.S. and Canada, Mexico edged past Canada to become the top destination for U.S. exports, claiming a 15.51% share to Canada\u2019s 15.49%.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>4<\/em><em>&nbsp;&nbsp;Top&nbsp;Destinations&nbsp;for U.S.&nbsp;Exports 12 months ending in October 2024 vs 2025<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1133\" height=\"383\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig4b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic comparing top countries of origin for U.S. exports in October 2024 vs. 2025.\" class=\"wp-image-243521\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig4b.webp 1133w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig4b-980x331.webp 980w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig4b-480x162.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) and (max-width: 980px) 980px, (min-width: 981px) 1133px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>In his December&nbsp;report to Congress&nbsp;on&nbsp;the&nbsp;administration\u2019s strategy&nbsp;for&nbsp;the&nbsp;joint&nbsp;review&nbsp;of USMCA, USTR Jamieson Greer noted that the trade pact has provided some certainty for North American trade. As our Census data&nbsp;indicates, Canada and Mexico are the mainstays of U.S. trade, accounting for 27% of imports, 30% of exports. According to the USTR,&nbsp;U.S. exports of goods and services to Canada and Mexico are up 56%&nbsp;since 2020. Over that same period, Mexico has captured about 25% of the reduction in U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China, \u201cdemonstrating the important role that Mexico plays in U.S. supply chain resilience.\u201d&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bottom line: the Trump administration would like to see USMCA&nbsp;renewed&nbsp;for a 16-year term, but there is a laundry list of issues to be addressed (summarized in the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/files\/Press\/Releases\/2025\/Ambassador%20Greer%20Reported%20to%20Congress%20on%20the%20Operation%20of%20the%20USMCA.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">USTR report to Congress<\/a>).&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Trans-Pacific Trade Shifts&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Surveying prospects for the year ahead in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kharon.com\/brief\/kharon-debrief-2025-us-tariffs-descartes-systems-group-jackson-wood\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">the Kharon Brief<\/a>, Jackson Wood, Director of Industry Strategy at Descartes, said he expects continued market disruption: \u201cEconomic security now is national security, and global trade is the primary domain of conflict.\u201d&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>U.S. maritime trade is on the front lines of the conflict created by U.S. tariffs and retaliatory measures. Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&nbsp;bill-of-lading (BOL) data shows that, after a July peak, monthly import volumes declined through year-end 2025.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>5<\/em><em>&nbsp;Monthly U.S. Maritime Import Volumes 2024 vs 2025<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"680\" height=\"490\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig5b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic comparing monthly U.S. maritime import volumes in 2024 and 2025.\" class=\"wp-image-243522\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig5b.webp 680w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig5b-480x346.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) 680px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>Much of the decline is accounted for by a 9.15% drop in shipments from East Asia, by far the leading regional source for U.S. maritime imports, responsible for 50.26% of the region\u2019s outbound shipments in 2024, 45% in 2025. As production hubs continued to shift to Southeast Asia, the region increased its U.S. market share, climbing 19% to claim a 22.04%&nbsp;share&nbsp;in 2025.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>6<\/em><em>&nbsp;Regional Sources for U.S. Maritime Imports Market Share 2024 vs 2025<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"781\" height=\"509\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig6b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic comparing regional sources for U.S. maritime import market share in 2024 and 2025.\" class=\"wp-image-243523\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig6b.webp 781w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig6b-480x313.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) 781px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>The downward trend in East Asia volumes is&nbsp;largely attributable&nbsp;to China, the source for around three-quarters of the region\u2019s trade with the U.S. Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&nbsp;BOL data&nbsp;indicates&nbsp;a -10.83% drop in shipments to the U.S. in 2025.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A footnote: Our BOL data shows waterborne import volumes from Taiwan declined -4.53% year-over-year. On the other hand, our Census data captures trade in Taiwan\u2019s top-value exports to the U.S. \u2013 computers, computer parts, and semiconductors \u2013 which ship by air. Census data for the 12 months ending October 2025 records a 58% year-over-year increase in the value of Taiwan\u2019s imports, lifting it to fifth-ranked among U.S. import countries of origin.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In contrast to waterborne imports, export volumes exceeded 2024 levels until a precipitous -21% drop at year-end 2025, as our BOL data shows:&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>7<\/em><em>&nbsp;Monthly&nbsp;U.S.&nbsp;Maritime&nbsp;Export Volumes 2024 vs 2025<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"652\" height=\"466\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig7b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic comparing monthly U.S. maritime export volumes in 2024 and 2025.\" class=\"wp-image-243524\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig7b.webp 652w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig7b-480x343.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) 652px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>The story here is one of retaliation&nbsp;against&nbsp;U.S. tariffs.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Agriculture in Distress&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Since&nbsp;U.S. agriculture slipped into recession in 2023, the sector\u2019s economic distress has become acute as China has specially targeted U.S. farm products&nbsp;for retaliatory action, starting with soybeans.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Until 2025, soybeans [HS120190] were the top U.S. agricultural export,&nbsp;generally accounting&nbsp;for a little over 16% of the value of this trade. Over the first 10 months of the year, soybeans slipped to a 9.4% share, ceding top ranking to corn [HS100590]. Our BOL data shows China was the destination for 52%\u201355% of U.S. soybeans shipped in each of the five years ending with 2024. Prior to the opening rounds of the China-U.S. trade dispute in 2018, China\u2019s share had been as high as 62%.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As our BOL export data illustrates, this trade came to an abrupt halt in 2025:&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>8<\/em><em>&nbsp;Monthly U.S. Maritime Exports of Soybeans to China 2025<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"611\" height=\"361\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig8b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic depicting U.S. maritime exports of soybeans to China in 2025.\" class=\"wp-image-243525\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig8b.webp 611w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig8b-480x284.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) 611px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>The&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iasoybeans.com\/newsroom\/article\/tracking-us-and-china-soybean-trade\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Iowa Soybean Association<\/a>&nbsp;was among those applauding the U.S. and China announcement&nbsp;because, as part of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/11\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">trade truce brokered in October<\/a>, the Chinese had committed to&nbsp;purchasing&nbsp;12 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans before calendar year end. After a slow start, China is on track to meet its commitment by the end of this February.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The blowback from U.S. tariffs has not been limited to soybeans. Over 20% of U.S. ag production is for export, according to the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fb.org\/market-intel\/agricultural-exports-101\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Farm Bureau<\/a>. Some&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.farmprogress.com\/cotton\/u-s-cotton-exports-account-for-88-total-use-this-year\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">88% of cotton raised<\/a>&nbsp;in the U.S. is bound for export markets. A little over&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.porkcheckoff.org\/markets\/us-pork-exports\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">30% of U.S. pork production<\/a>&nbsp;is for exports. A top customer for these and other U.S. agricultural exports, China has levied tariffs on a comprehensive list of products including pork, beef, and cotton. This table summarizes ensuing cutbacks in China\u2019s purchases:&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>9<\/em><em>&nbsp;China&#8217;s Cutbacks in Agricultural Exports from the U.S.<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"784\" height=\"607\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig9b.webp\" alt=\"Table comparing China\u2019s cutbacks in agricultural exports from the U.S. in 2024 and 2025. \" class=\"wp-image-243526\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig9b.webp 784w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig9b-480x372.webp 480w\" sizes=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 480px) 480px, (min-width: 481px) 784px, 100vw\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>The resulting surplus of U.S. products that would otherwise have shipped to China has driven down prices, straining producers\u2019 finances. China has also slapped&nbsp;export controls on fertilizers&nbsp;with the&nbsp;apparent&nbsp;aim of boosting global market prices (a move that has gotten some push-back from its domestic producers,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.farmprogress.com\/marketing\/china-s-phosphate-export-restrictions-could-drive-up-fertilizer-prices-for-u-s-farmers\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">according to Farm Progress<\/a>).&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Agricultural equipment manufacturer&nbsp;Deere has warned the economic distress is not limited to farmers.&nbsp;Cory Reed, president of the company\u2019s agriculture and turf division,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/523ad7d3-acb1-45f1-a165-6658b48e8c8e\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">told the Financial Times<\/a>&nbsp;that demand for expensive farm equipment in the U.S.&nbsp;is faltering as growers contend with weak crop prices, higher input costs,&nbsp;and persistent trade uncertainty.&nbsp;The&nbsp;company&nbsp;has cut back on domestic production and laid off factory workers.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Reindustrialization: Not There Yet&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/774e7180-48b6-4813-969d-845462f5838f\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">express objective<\/a>&nbsp;of U.S. tariffs under the Trump administration is to accelerate the re-industrialization of the U.S. That tariffs can be deployed to achieve that end remains to be seen. The available data suggests that the manufacturing sector, which fell into recession in 2023 after the Federal Reserve raised interest rates, is still contracting, as&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/finance-and-economics\/2026\/01\/06\/americas-missing-manufacturing-renaissance\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">reported by The Economist<\/a>&nbsp;(the source for the next chart).&nbsp;There\u2019s&nbsp;an upswing in domestic production of semiconductors and computers; however,&nbsp;these are outliers,&nbsp;benefiting&nbsp;from&nbsp;previous&nbsp;administrations\u2019 support (most recently, the CHIPs Act), some&nbsp;carve-outs from 2025\u2019s reciprocal U.S. tariffs (see, for instance, the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.commerce.gov\/news\/fact-sheets\/2026\/01\/fact-sheet-restoring-american-semiconductor-manufacturing-leadership\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">agreement on trade and investment with Taiwan<\/a>) and booming demand from data centers.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Figure&nbsp;<\/em><em>10<\/em><em>&nbsp;Change in U.S. Manufacturing Production (against a 2017 baseline) 2000-2025<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"426\" height=\"439\" src=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig10b.webp\" alt=\"Graphic depicting the change in U.S. manufacturing production from 2000 through 2025, against a 2017 baseline.\" class=\"wp-image-243527\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig10b.webp 426w, https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/wp-content\/blogs.dir\/1\/files\/2026\/01\/Fig10b-291x300.webp 291w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 426px) 100vw, 426px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\"><em>Source:&nbsp;The Economist; Federal Reserve<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>It\u2019s&nbsp;a little soon to expect big gains in reshoring. The costs exacted by U.S. tariffs are still rippling through cross-border supply chains. It will take years for the new manufacturing capacity promised FDI investors to get up and running.&nbsp;Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company&nbsp;(TSMC)&nbsp;announced plans to invest in a semiconductor manufacturing site near Phoenix, Arizona in May 2020. The first wafer fabrication facility (of six planned)&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tsmc.com\/static\/abouttsmcaz\/index.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">began production in 4Q24<\/a>. Construction on the second&nbsp;fab&nbsp;was completed in 2025. Samsung\u2019s new&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/semiconductor.samsung.com\/sas\/company\/taylor\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">chip fabrication facility in Taylor, Texas<\/a>&nbsp;is scheduled to come online in the latter half of 2026.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the meantime, businesses will have to contend with an environment in which, as Jackson Wood has said:&nbsp;\u201cVolatility is no longer episodic.&nbsp;It\u2019s&nbsp;structural.\u201d&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">How Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&nbsp;Can Help&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>In an environment shaped by persistent trade volatility and evolving U.S. tariffs, access to&nbsp;timely, granular trade data is essential. Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&nbsp;provides bill&nbsp;of&nbsp;lading and Census data that enables businesses, analysts, and policymakers to&nbsp;monitor&nbsp;shifts in global supply chains,&nbsp;identify&nbsp;changes in sourcing and demand, and assess the real-world impact of trade policies as they unfold.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With visibility into import and export flows by country, port, commodity, and company, Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&nbsp;helps organizations&nbsp;anticipate&nbsp;risk, uncover new opportunities, and make informed decisions&nbsp;amid ongoing tariff-driven disruption.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.datamyne.com\/contact-us\/request-an-online-demo\/?utm_source=datamyne.com&amp;utm_medium=display&amp;utm_campaign=DTM_TariffsYeildMixedResults_Article\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">To see&nbsp;how Descartes Datamyne can support your trade analysis and strategy, request a demo today.<\/a>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>U.S. trade policies scored tactical gains in 2025, closing the trade gap and boosting&nbsp;Foreign Direct Investment&nbsp;(FDI). But the strategic&nbsp;objective&nbsp;\u2013 reindustrializing the U.S. \u2013&nbsp;remains&nbsp;a distant goal. Meanwhile, Descartes&nbsp;Datamyne&#x2122;&nbsp;data shows, some sectors are sustaining collateral damage as U.S. tariffs strain and reshape global trade relationships.&nbsp;&nbsp; Key Takeaways&nbsp; Data released&nbsp;on&nbsp;January 8 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)&nbsp;indicates&nbsp;progress [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"off","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[719,1460,2938],"class_list":["post-243507","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-trade-data","tag-global-trade","tag-supply-chains","tag-us-tariffs"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>U.S. Tariffs Yield Gains and Losses in Global 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